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Abstract
The present paper proposes a paradigm to understand the evolution of religious behaviour speciﬁ -
cally Jewish religious practice.  The theoretical framework rests upon a combination of reciprocal 
altruism, costly signal theory and cognitive dissonance. It assumes evolutionary theory in general 
and mimetic evolution in particular. It is unique to the degree that it is authored by an evolutionary 
psychologist who is also a rabbi. We present the foundations of the three bio-psychological theo-
ries; and address Dawkins’ and Dennett’s theories of the scientiﬁ c study of religion as well as some 
of the reservations. Finally, we examine brieﬂ y certain Jewish rituals in light of the model pre-
sented. 
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Introduction
Any study of religious practice is, by deﬁ nition, speculative1. There is no way to 
conﬁ rm or disconﬁ rm any proposed account of the origins of religious behaviour in 
as much as we have no true witnesses. To be sure, those who take a fundamentalist 
approach to religion will claim that the Bible in general and the Hebrew Bible in 
particular provide us with clear facts as to the origins of the world and of humanity. 
However, with the advent of scientiﬁ c inquiry and evolutionary theory, the divine 
authorship of the Bible has been called into question. 
The methods herein do not provide hard and fast proof that evolutionary theory 
can explain religious evolution. Nor can we conclude that our behaviours, religious 
or otherwise, evolved in a particular fashion. As such, any paradigm offered to ex-
plain a particular set of human behaviours is just that: a paradigm. 
1  The development of this paradigm is an intial product in an ongoing project of the Center for the 
Study of Bio-social Perspectives on Judaism at the Schechter Institute of Jewish Studies. I am grateful to 
Binah Yiztrit Foundation and its founder Rick Goldberg for their continued support.
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On the other hand, if we accept that the world is over four billion years old, and 
that humanity is a product of biological evolution, it stands to reason that the sum 
total of human behaviors evolved over millions of years, from the early hominids to 
later homo-erectus and ultimately homo-sapiens. The process of natural selection 
leads to the survival of certain traits and behaviors at the expense of other traits and 
behaviours. The current paper, therefore, will present a paradigm from which I hope 
will emerge scientiﬁ c inquiry and experimentation as to why Jewish religious behav-
iours have survived for nearly 2000 years.  
One may ask how evolutionary theory could be applied to the Jewish people. 
Indeed, the primary measure of evolutionary ﬁ tness is reproductive success. By this 
criterion, Jews have not been very successful. However, we must look at that question 
with two signiﬁ cant caveats. First, the number of members of any particular group is 
not the only measure of evolutionary success. Indeed, we may say that the fact that 
Jewish religious practice as propagated by Jews has lasted for so long, despite the 
small number of proponents, suggests a certain success. Indeed, Deuteronomy (7:7) 
states explicitly that God chose the Jewish people because their destiny was to be 
small in number. Cultural evolutionary theory might well explain this by assuming 
that the authors of Deuteronomy needed to provide textual support for the empirical 
observation that Israelite culture did not spread throughout the world; the architects 
of that culture were faced with the fact that they were going to be out-numbered by 
most peoples.  
However, there is another, more important way to address this reservation of evo-
lutionary success. Evolutionary success is not only (indeed usually not) measured by 
comparing members of different species. It is measured by comparing the success 
within the species. We do not ask if a guppy is more successful than a lion, or if a pea-
cock is more successful than a reindeer. Rather, we attempt to understand how certain 
members of the species succeed more than other members of that same species. Here 
reproductive success is the primary empirical measure.
From this perspective, we must ﬁ rst look at the term “species” in a metaphoric 
sense. Obviously, Jews are not a different species from any other human culture. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper that is how I would suggest we look at 
them. We will not compare Jews to Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Americans or 
Atheists. We compare Jews to Jews. And this makes cultural-biological sense. For 
many years Jews tried to mate exclusively within their “species.” Those who did not 
were no longer part of the “species.” Therefore, the proper question is which type of 
Jews succeeded reproductively. To this question the answer is clear. The more pious 
far out-reproduce their less religious coreligionists. The application of evolutionary 
theory to Jewish religious practice can help to explain why the most successful mem-
bers of the Jewish “species” tend to be the most religious and, at the same time, shun 
modernity, which is assumed to be reproductively beneﬁ cial2. 
2  There is a certain implied irony to modern reproductive “behaviours”. It is entirely possible that 
the least religious members of society are actually more “successful” than their religious compatriots. 
That is they may copulate with greater frequency. However, this does not always lead to pregnancy. 
In fact it is likely that pregnancy is avoided by birth control methods. The application of reproductive 
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Two particular religious behaviours stand out as predictors of Jewish reproductive 
success: circumcision (milah) and familial ritual purity (niddah). Numerous studies 
tie circumcision to a decreased level of infection with sexually transmitted diseases3. 
This alone does not distinguish any particular “branch” or “stream” of Judaism, but 
there is a link between lower incidence of STD’s and reproductive success4.
A more forceful argument can be made for those who practice niddah. The laws 
of niddah proscribe sexual contact between a husband and wife to certain times of the 
woman’s menstrual cycle. Not coincidentally, couples may engage in sexual inter-
course only at the most fertile time of the woman’s cycle. Indeed, they are prohibited 
from any intimate contact during the other times. This has both an emotional and bio-
logical effect. The emotional one is less of a concern for the current paper. However, 
given that the married couple engages in sexual intercourse at this time, it has a clear 
impact on their reproductive success5.
In the context of the Jewish people, those who adhere to these, as well as other 
ritual practices tend to have more children. Indeed, the most pious Jews in the state of 
Israel represent the fastest growing sector of the Jewish population6. Moreover, to the 
degree that we can assume that the Orthodox Jews in the United States tend to adhere 
to these practices more than the members of the other streams, we can assume that 
this explains why this group is the fastest growing there as well7. It is hard to make 
similar assessments in Europe due to the tragedy that befell the Jewish people in the 
past century. Anecdotal evidence, however, seems to lend support to a similar trend 
among Europe’s Orthodox Jewish population as well.
Finally, this can all be tied together based on the research of Richard Sosis8, upon 
which I will expand below. Communities that place higher demands on their members 
tend to outlast others. To the degree that ritual demands on Jews have been a constant, 
success as measured by sheer numbers of offspring may be misleading when applied to any human sub-
-group. This gives greater importance to the within-species measures of success. All groups of Jews de-
sire that their cultural memes become mainstream. Yet the more modern streams of Judaism attempt this 
primarily by education rather than by reproduction. The jury is still out, but the sociological predictions 
seem to be in favour of the latter.   
3  Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Male Circumcision, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/malecir-
cumcision/ [accessed: 20.12. 2012]; M. Konner, The Jewish Body, New York 2009; M. Konner, Toward 
a Sociobiology of the Jews: Sexual Selection, Circumcision, and the Centrality of texts in a Coevolutiona-
ry Framework [in:] Judaism in Biological Perspective: Biblical Lore and Judaic Practices, R. Goldberg 
(ed.), Boulder 2009, p. 84–117.
4  M. Konner, Evolutionary Studies of Human Behavior: The Case of (Jewish) Religious Practice 
(in print).
5  R. Goldberg, Biosocial Regulation of Husband and Wife. The Requirement for Periodic Conjugal 
Separation and Reunion [in:] Judaism in Biological Perspective: Biblical Lore and Judaic Practices,
R. Goldberg (ed. Boulder 2009, p. 118–138; M. Konner, The Jewish Body..., M. Konner, Toward a So-
ciobiology…
6  Y. Bistrov, A. Sofer, Israel Demograhic: 2010–2030. On the path to a religious state, http://web.
hevra.haifa.ac.il/~ch-strategy/images/publications/demography_2010.pdf [accessed: 10.10.2012].
7  S. Cohen, Jewish Community Study of New York: 2011, New York 2011.
8  R. Sosis, Religion and Intragroup Cooperation: Preliminary Results of a Comparative Analysis 
of Utopian Communities, “Cross-Cultural Research” 2000, No. 34, p. 70–87; R. Sosis, Why aren’t we all 
Hutterites? Costly signaling theory and religious behavior, “Human Nature” 2003, No. 14, p. 91–127.
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and that membership historically in the Jewish people was primarily based upon be-
haviour and not belief, we can conclude that the evolutionary theories expanded upon 
below can be a contributing factor to Jewish survival. This may be the case when 
Jews are compared “inter-species”, and it may be why the most pious continue to 
succeed genetically more than their less observant co-religionists.
Setting the stage: Th e social scientifi c study of religion 
Three bio-psychological behaviours, when taken together, can further our under-
standing of the evolution of religious behaviours millions of years ago and why, de-
spite scientiﬁ c evidence and discovery to the contrary, religions continue to exist and 
even grow today. First, the concept of reciprocal altruism as introduced by Robert 
Trivers9. Second, costly signaling or handicaps as proposed by Amotz Zahavi10  and, 
ﬁ nally, Leon Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory11.
The paper will begin with a brief survey of the two evolutionary concepts of 
signal theory and reciprocal altruism. We will then explore how these concepts have 
been applied to human cultural evolution – particularly religious evolution. Finally, 
we will explore a limited number of Jewish religious practices. 
Humanity: social or cultural being 
Baumeister, Bauer and Lloyd12 in their study of religious behaviour draw a ﬁ ne 
though important distinction between humans and the rest of the animal kingdom. 
They propose that humanity is not simply social like bees, ants, or dogs13 We are cul-
tural. Religion is a subset of this cultural legacy. Steven Pinker14 teaches us how our 
brain structures give rise to this subtle yet profound difference. In short, our highly 
developed cortex allows for human metacognitive abilities that when coupled with 
9  R.L. Trivers, The evolution of reciprocal altruism, “Quarterly Review of Biology” 1971, No. 46, 
p. 35–57.
10  A. Zahavi, Mate selection -a selection for a handicap, “Journal Theoretical Biology” 1975, No. 
53, p. 205–214; A. Zahavi, A. Zahavi, The handicap principle: a missing piece of Darwin’s puzzle, 
Oxford 1997.
11  L. Festinger, A theory of cognitive dissonance, Stanford 1957; L. Festinger, Cognitive dissonance, 
“Scientiﬁ c American” 1962, No. 20, p. 93–107.
12  R.F. Baumeister, I.M.Bauer, S.A. Lloyd, Choice, free will, and religion, “Psychology of Religion 
and Spirituality” 2010, No. 2, p. 67–82.
13  J. Graham, J. Haidt, Beyond Beliefs: Religions Bind Individual into moral communities, “Perso-
nality and Social Psychology Review” 2010, No. 14, p. 140–150; J. Maynard Smith, D. Harper, Animal 
Signals, New York 2003; R.L. Trivers, Social Evolution, Menlo Park, CA 1985.
14  S. Pinker, How the Mind Works, New York 1997; S. Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial 
of Human Nature, New York 2002.
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available leisure time, associated primarily with humans, give rise to culture – activi-
ties that provide “meaning” in an otherwise meaningless system. Religions evolve 
because we seek agents who become the object of this meaning15.
Reciprocal Altruism
According to theories of evolution, kin will help kin in order to increase the likeli-
hood of passing its genes on to the next generation16. In his classic book, The Selﬁ sh 
Gene Richard Dawkins explains that the gene as a replicator has one “selﬁ sh” “goal”: 
to ensure that it exists in future generations. It is not selﬁ shness in the classic sense 
that explains this behaviour. Selﬁ shness of that sort would require a consciousness 
not associated with lower mammals or reptiles or ﬁ sh. Neither is a gene goal directed. 
Genes, even those belonging to sentient beings, are not sentient themselves. Rather, 
they are successful replicators, a virus if you will. The most “ﬁ t” gene can be de-
scribed as the most efﬁ cient replicator. This efﬁ ciency is measured by the chance that 
the gene will survive to replicate itself.
When biologists discuss altruism, or its social “cousin” reciprocal altruism, they 
talk of a type of selﬂ ess behaviour, albeit with an expected pay back in the not so dis-
tant future17. Trivers explains the theory in his study of vampire bats. These bats live 
on the blood of other mammals. Like all animals, they get sick. On those occasions, 
the sick bat cannot leave its cave to hunt for blood. A bat that does not eat for even 
a period as short as 24 hours is in a perilous life-threatening situation. Trivers showed 
that the bats could remember those who were helped yet did not return the favour 
in future hunts. The individuals that did not help other sick bats on later hunts were 
labelled “cheaters” and the chance that they would be fed on subsequent occasions 
when they were sick was lower. 
Costly signals
Most complex species combine the use of index signals and handicap signals when 
they engage in ritualistic behaviours18. According to evolutionary theory, an index 
is an unfakeable signal. The depth of the croak of certain frogs is an example of 
an index; it is always in direct relation to the size of the frog. The handicap princi-
ple suggests that reliable signals must be costly to the signaller, costing the signaler 
15  See e.g.: S. Atran, A. Norenzayan, Religion’s Evolutionary Landscape: Counterintuition, commit-
ment, compassion, communion, “Behavioral and Brain Sciences” 2004, No. 27, p. 1–58; J.L. Barrett, Why 
Would Anyone Believe in God?, Walnut Creek, CA 2004.
16  R. Dawkins, The Selﬁ sh Gene, New York 1976; R.L. Trivers, The evolution of reciprocal altru-
ism..., R.L. Trivers, Social Evolution...; R. Wright, The Moral Animal: Why we are the way we are, New 
York 1994.
17  R.L. Trivers, The evolution of reciprocal altruism…
18  J. Maynard Smith, D. Harper, Animal Signals…; R.L. Trivers, Social Evolution…
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something that could not be afforded by an individual with less of a particular trait19. 
These rituals help maintain hierarchies20, enhance communication and lead to suc-
cessful courtship and mating. The rituals are ﬁ xed complex patterns21, though there 
may be certain variation from one generation to the next22.
There is no need to expand upon Zahavi’s23, theory here, other than referring to 
the classic examples of peacocks’ tails and reindeers’ antlers. It is a waste of evolu-
tionary resources and a self-endangering characteristic for a peacock to grow a tail 
that is, on the one hand, so colourful, but on the other, so heavy. The weight of the tail 
is an impediment to survival to the degree that its bearer would have a harder time 
in either ﬂ ight or ﬁ ght. The reindeer’s’ heavy antlers provide a similar handicap. The 
antlers’ weight and bulkiness make it difﬁ cult to manoeuvre in the wild. The male 
that can afford either the antlers or the plumage signals that, despite the costliness of 
the attribute, they are still ﬁ t to survive.
From signal to ritual
Maynard Smith and Harper24 explain how animal rituals may come about. In their 
study of various species, they assert that rituals are stylised or exaggerated forms of 
movements that naturally occur when a member of the species initiates action. The 
ritualised behaviours may have nothing to do with the initial goal of the action. 
Animal rituals as a metaphor for human rituals
How then do we apply these biological theories to humans? We have neither tails nor 
antlers. We do not, in general, eat each other, though we do engage in mating and 
warring behaviours. The question of the application of these theories to human be-
haviour in general and to religious behaviour in particular becomes important when 
we search for the members of our self-deﬁ ned in-group for purposes of mating and 
culture making.
For more than two decades, anthropologists have applied signal theory to human 
behaviour25. Donath26 claims in her study of virtual social networks claims that hu-
19  A. Zahavi, Mate selection -a selection for a handicap…; A. Zahavi, A. Zahavi, The handicap 
principle: a missing piece of Darwin’s puzzle…
20  R.L. Trivers, Social Evolution…
21  J. Maynard Smith, D. Harper, Animal Signals…
22  R.L. Trivers, Social Evolution…
23  A. Zahavi, Mate selection -a selection for a handicap…
24  A. Zahavi, Mate selection -a selection for a handicap…
25  L. Cronk, The Application of animal signaling theory to human phenomena: some thoughts and 
clariﬁ cations, “Social Science Information” 2005, No. 5, p. 603–620.
26  J. Donath, Signals in Social Supernets, “Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication” 2007, 
No. 13/1, article 12, http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/donath.html [accessed: 9.10.2012].
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mans must rely on complex signals as we must make snap decisions and have little 
information on which to base these decisions. She notes that many virtual networks 
require a great deal of information in order to join. 
Bliege Bird and Smith27 clarify how many of our very human behaviours are 
indeed signals – be they indices or handicaps. Those who engage in these behav-
iours often gain social standing despite, perhaps paradoxically, a lowering of their 
own individual prestige. In their review, they also explore a number of socio-cultural 
behaviours according to the theory of reciprocal altruism. They contend that it moti-
vates hunters to share the spoils of their hunt, encourages families in less traditional 
cultures to provide extravagant feasts in the context of some life cycle event with the 
implicit societal expectation is that they will receive the same in return at some later 
date
Finally, Zahavi28, Cronk29,  Donath30, Bliege Bird31 and Mahoney32, among others, 
make the leap from animals to humans by asserting that social prestige is evolution-
ary capital gained from the uniquely human signals. They explore the literature to 
assert that behaviours varying from public generosity to extravagant piety are indeed 
forms of social competition. The elaboration of all areas of human signalling is not 
the focus of the current paper. Sufﬁ ce to say that there is extensive literature from 
both anthropology and psychology that says that we indeed do employ signals and 
reciprocal altruism. Moreover, the realms in which these signals act are numerous. In 
short: we give in order to get when we need. We pray in order to prove our worthi-
ness. 
Thus, signaling honest and detailed information about one’s quality requires handicaps. The 
same signals that display accurately the superiority of one signaler will display accurately the 
inferiority of others. Therefore, the purpose of the handicap is to help provide reliable informa-
tion that the receiver needs that would otherwise not be available33. 
Consider someone who regularly attends shul [synagogue]. According to my earlier argument, 
by attending shul one indexically signals the acceptance of the moral strictures that are the 
foundation of the synagogue’s theology34. 
27  R. Bliege Bird, E.A.Smith, Signaling Theory, Strategic Interaction and Symbolic Capital, “Cur-
rent Anthropology” 2005, No. 46, p. 221–248.
28  A. Zahavi, The Handicap Principle in Human Social Interaction [in:] Judaism in Biological Per-
spective: Biblical Lore and Judaic Practices, R. Goldberg (ed.), Boulder 2009, p. 166–172.
29  L. Cronk, The Application of animal signaling theory…
30  J. Donath, Signals in Social Supernets…
31  R. Bliege Bird, E.A.Smith, Signaling Theory…
32  A. Mahoney, Theological Expressions as Costly Signals of Religious Commitments [in:] The Evo-
lution of Religion, Studies, Theories & Critiques, J. Bulbulia, R. Sosis, E. Harris, R. Genet, C. Genet,
K. Wyman, (eds.), Santa Margarita, CA 2008, p.161–166.
33  A. Zahavi, The Handicap Principle in Human Social Interaction…, p. 169.
34  R. Sosis, Why are Synagogue Services so Long? An Evolutionary Examination of Jewish Ritual 
Signals’ [in:] Judaism in Biological Perspective: Biblical Lore and Judaic Practices, R. Goldberg (ed.), 
Boulder 2009, p. 209 [italics in original, brackets mine – P. S-F.]
Publikacja objęta jest prawem autorskim. Wszelkie prawa zastrzeżone. Kopiowanie i rozpowszechnianie zabronione.  
Publikacja przeznaczona jedynie dla klientów indywidualnych. Zakaz rozpowszechniania i udostępniania serwisach bibliotecznych
190
Bio-psycho-social perspectives on religion
Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins assert that for years religious thinkers have 
claimed to be beyond or even above examination by the same tools employed in the 
study of other social phenomena35. They ﬁ nd this claim to be irrelevant at best and 
harmful as worst. For even if some gain psychological support from religion, as a so-
ciety we should be able to provide this support through other socio-cultural vehicles. 
Sequestering one’s theory from the social-scientiﬁ c inquiry, contend Dawkins and 
Dennett, is wrought with paranoia for fear of being exposed as false.
This paper assumes a basic understanding of Richard Dawkins’ evolutionary bi-
ology theory presented in his classic book The Selﬁ sh Gene (1976). It also assumes 
the basic premise of mimetic evolution. “Memes,” he said, “are tunes, ideas, catch 
phrases, clothes fashions… Just as genes propagate themselves by leaping from body 
to body via sperm or eggs, so memes propagate themselves by leaping from brain to 
brain via a process, which… can be called imitation36.  Dawkins supposes that the 
idea of a god or gods is a meme in the classic sense. He is not sure when the idea ﬁ rst 
appeared, assuming that it appeared in different places at different times. Yet in as 
much as God cannot be measured scientiﬁ cally, it is a meme.
To expand upon the vehement opposition Dawkins has met is not necessary in the 
current context. However, it should be clear that this opposition predated Dennett and 
Dawkins by nearly 1000 years. Maimonides, the medieval Jewish religious thinker 
codiﬁ ed as law the attitude that God’s ways are beyond human scrutiny:
The Holy blessed One does not know with a knowledge that is external from Him as do men, 
whose knowledge and selves are two [different entities]. Rather, He, may His name be praised, 
and His knowledge are one.
Human knowledge cannot comprehend this concept in its entirety for just as it is beyond the 
potential of man to comprehend and conceive the essential nature of the Creator, as [Exodus 
33:20] states: “No man will perceive Me and live,” so, too, it is beyond man’s potential to com-
prehend and conceive the Creator’s knowledge (Mishne Torah, Laws of Teshuva 5:5, in original 
Hebrew, italics and brackets mine)
Indeed, Dennett has had this critique levelled at him directly as proof of why reli-
gious practice and beliefs and God should not be studied:
One reader… complained… that by treating the hypothesis of God as just one more scientiﬁ c 
hypothesis, to be evaluated by the standards of science in particular and rational thought in 
general [he and Dawkins] are ignoring the very widespread claim by believers in God that their 
faith is quite beyond reason, not a matter to which such mundane testing applies37.
35  R. Dawkins, The God Delusion, London 2006; D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution 
and the Meanings of Life, New York 1995; D. Dennett, Breaking the Spell, Religion as a Natural Pheno-
menon, New York 2006.
36  R. Dawkins, The Selﬁ sh Gene…, p. 192.
37  D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea…, p. 153.
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Some ten years later, in Breaking the Spell Dennett (2006) still found it necessary 
to elaborate what he meant when he ventured into his study of religion. His approach 
to religion is as a natural phenomenon, that is, emanating from nature. By “natural”, 
he does not mean that religion is an artefact or spandrel, as do many other scientists 
who study religion38. It is transmitted culturally. Religion is natural in the same way 
that sports or cancers are natural. “It is a human phenomenon composed of events, 
organisms, objects, structures, patterns, and the like that all obey the laws of physics 
or biology…”39. 
The “holier than thou, we are beyond study” attitude espoused by religious think-
ers has, perhaps, been its own downfall. By claiming to be a social phenomenon but 
claiming to be above investigation, the aloof attitude has turned away many potential 
allies. Dennett directly assails this attitude. He asserts that just as religions represent 
social phenomena, they ought to be subjected to the same rigorous study to prove its 
truth or falsify their foundations. 
When Dennett40 asks the questions: “can science study religion? ” and “should 
it?”, his answers are compelling, although they may be considered self-evident. To 
answer the ﬁ rst question, Dennett restates his assertion that religion is a natural social 
phenomenon and can be studied. Indeed, he reminds us that until Darwin’s time, re-
ligion was the focus of a great deal of scientiﬁ c inquiry. 
The current review does not claim to be more objective or broader than others 
that came before it. However, it is written by someone who lives a life fulﬁ lled by 
religious practice informed by non-fundamentalist belief alongside a respect for sci-
entiﬁ c enquiry of wonder and awe of human nature, its follies and foibles. 
Building community
If God does exist, would God not create humans with a mind that seeks God? This 
indeed is a poignant question. The issue revolves around the existence of yet another 
intangible: the mind. We feel that our minds exist. However, I have never seen one; 
brains, yes, minds, no. Many consider this mind to be an epiphenomenon of the 
physical structure of the brain41. One that evolved over millions of years to solve the 
problems of survival in the savannah or rain forest. This section will explore, brieﬂ y, 
our cognitive faculties that may give rise to a belief in supernatural agents – a deity 
– a god or gods. 
Many theories have been put forth to explain why this particular mind exists. The 
bearer of a mind that seeks animate agents or causality has a greater chance of evo-
lutionary survival. This mechanism has been termed the hyperactive agent-detecting 
38  S. Atran, A. Norenzayan, Religion’s Evolutionary Landscape…; J.L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone 
Believe in God?...
39  D. Dennett, Breaking the Spell, Religion as a Natural Phenomenon…, p. 25.
40  Ibidem.
41  S. Pinker, How the Mind Works...
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device (HADD)42. In this light that many students of the evolutionary study of reli-
gion see God as well43: God’s existence is a byproduct of evolution44. Put succinctly: 
if I hear a sound from behind the bush and attribute it to a snake or a bear or lion, that 
is my minds solves the unknown source of the disruption by assuming an animate 
cause, and I run, I stand a better chance of passing my genes on to the next genera-
tion. If it turns out to be the wind, not much is lost (unless I unwittingly run into 
another lion) If on the other hand I assume the cause to be the wind and it is in fact 
a lion, then I become lunch rather than an efﬁ cient replicator. If I assume the exist-
ence of an omnipotent God and can convince others of my belief then I will improve 
my biological ﬁ tness and replicate (reproduce) with greater success.
Atkinson and Bourrat45 have shown that beliefs in supernatural monitoring of 
behaviour and punishment promote compliance with social-cultural norms. Their un-
derlying assumption is that one of the difﬁ culties in ascertaining honest participants 
in cultural groups is policing. In addition, the ability to discern cheaters is another 
important factor in establishing group cohesion. This can perhaps explain why an 
idea such as God may have evolved in the minds of humans, whose primary goal was 
survival. As a result, groups need to know who was really part of the group and who 
was trying to get a free ride for purposes of protection, cooperation and reproduction. 
One can promise to show up for tomorrow’s hunt46. 
Graham and Haidt47 review data that support the theory that members of religious 
groups tend to be more generous and happier. They also view religion as an effective 
means to achieve moral community. By strengthening the in-group binds, religion is 
particularly able to identify those who would fake religiosity. Perhaps by the policing 
mechanisms noted above by Atkinson and Bourrat48 or perhaps by requiring beliefs 
that are too difﬁ cult to fake49.
Richard Sosis50 also studied the communal impact of religious behaviour. He and 
his colleagues analysed the staying power of communal settlements over the 18th 
42  J. L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God?, S. Pinker, How the Mind Works…
43  J. Dow, How evolution created God: The Search for the origins of religion. Paper presented at 
the 86th Annual Meeting of the Central States Anthropological Society, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, 
2–5April, 2009.
44  J. Bulbulia, Religious Costs as Adaptation that Signal Altruistic Intention, “Evolution and Cog-
nition” 2004, No. 10, p. 19–42.
45  Q.D. Atkinson, P. Bourrat, Beliefs about God, the afterlife and morality support the role of super-
natural policing in human cooperation, “Evolution & Human Behavior” 2011, No. 32, p. 41–49
46  R. Sosis, Religion and Intragroup Cooperation: Preliminary Results of a Comparative Analysis of 
Utopian Communities, “Cross-Cultural Research” 2000, No. 34, p. 70–87; R. Sosis, Religious Behaviors, 
Badges, and Bans: Signaling Theory and the Evolution of Religion [in:] Where God and Science Meet: 
How Brain and Evolutionary Studies Alter Our Understanding of Religion, vol. 1: Evolution, Genes, and 
the Religious Brain, P. McNamara (ed.), Westport 2006, p. 61–86.
47  J. Graham, J. Haidt, Beyond Beliefs…
48  Q.D. Atkinson, P. Bourrat, Beliefs about God…
49  R. Sosis, Why aren’t we all Hutterites?...
50  R. Sosis, Religion and Intragroup Cooperation…; Idem, Why aren’t we all Hutterites?...
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and 19th centuries51. They found that the communes that had a religious foundation 
maintained their communal nature for longer periods. They surmised that it was the 
ritualised interaction between members that kept them together longer.
Bulbulia and Mahoney52 studied the religious altruism of Christians in New Zea-
land. In a series of studies, they found that Christian New Zealanders were more 
likely to donate to Christian Canadians than they were to support other non-Christian 
New Zealanders. This ﬁ nding conﬁ rms the notion that religious identiﬁ cation helps 
to inform group cohesion and that it is a powerful sign and signal of an in-group 
worthy of sponsorship. 
Sosis, together with Bradley Rufﬂ e53 also studied Israeli kibbutzim. They found 
that there was a direct relationship between religious behaviours and cooperative 
behaviour. Religious males, who in Orthodox Judaism “sacriﬁ ce” the most time in 
order to signal their religiosity score highest on measures of cooperative behaviour 
compared to religious females, secular males and secular females. In addition, reli-
gious men who engage the most in ritual behaviours tend to exhibit the trait we call 
cooperation more than the other groups. Finally, the religious kibbutzim tend to stay 
true to their socialist foundations longer than non-religious kibbutzim54. Taken as 
a whole, the studies above give us an insight into what people are willing to do in 
order to retain group cohesion and identity.
One limitation is worth noting, though it is primarily methodological. We often 
confuse correlation studies as providing cause-and-effect results. It is crucial to keep 
in mind that the correlations noted do not prove that increased religious behaviour 
leads to increased cooperativeness. They say that these two behavioural traits vary in 
concert with one another. Perhaps the casual direction is reversed: cooperative people 
tend to ﬁ nd themselves in ritualistic or religious communities.
Another possible interpretation might be that there is another underlying trait or 
tendency that predicts these two variables. Whatever the “true” scientiﬁ c explana-
tion, the ﬁ ndings from the above data can help us to understand the seeming innate 
and natural development of religious behaviour. Humans are social-cultural beings. 
In order to express that need, in order to survive, we developed, long ago, systems to 
keep people together and to help us know who was with us and who was “agin’ us”. 
Or, those who pray together stay together.
In summary, religion communicates reliable information so that I can know who 
is part of my group. The main components are costly signalling and reciprocal altru-
51  R. Sosis, A. Candace, Signaling, Solidarity, and the Sacred: The Evolution of Religious Beha-
vior’, “Evolutionary Anthropology” 2003, No. 12, p. 264–274.
52  J. Bulbulia, A. Mahoney, Religious Solidarity: The Hand Grenade Experiment, “Journal of Cog-
nition and Culture” 2008, No. 8, p. 295–320.
53  B.J. Rufﬂ e, R. Sosis, Does It Pay To Pray? Costly Ritual and Cooperation, „The B.E. Journal 
of Economic Analysis & Policy” 2007, No. 7, article 18, http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol7/iss1/art18 
[accessed:10.09.2012].
54  R. Shapira, Communal decline: The vanishing of high-moral leaders and the decay of democratic, 
high-trust kibbutz cultures, “Sociological Inquiry” 2001, No. 71, p. 13–38; R. Shapira, Academic Capital 
or Scientiﬁ c Progress? A critique of studies of kibbutz stratiﬁ cation, “Journal of Anthropological Rese-
arch” 2005, No. 61, p. 357–380
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ism. As a result, I will be more trusting of and more willing to help in-group mem-
bers. The assumption is that if someone is willing to make the effort to identify as 
religious, they probably are religious and we share their same mimetic values. Just as 
I want my genetic progeny to come into the world, so do I want my mimetic progeny. 
Those who share these beliefs will most reliably help me pass on my memes.
Identifying religious identifi cation
Richard Sosi55 consolidates the types of signals sent by humans in general and reli-
gious humans in particular. He claims that in order to integrate fully into the religious 
fabric I must possess some combination of three socio-religious signals: behaviours 
(rituals) badges (religious garments) and bans (forbidden actions). These three when 
combined send a very powerful message to their beholders. The message is that I am 
truly part of your group. Why else would I pray every day, why else would I attend 
church or synagogue or the mosque. Life would be much simpler without them.
The badges are often multi-faceted signals, too. For example, the tallit (prayer 
shawl) is, in certain Jewish communities, as reliable sign of marital status. The style 
and size of a yarmulke worn by Jews conveys certain political and social information 
as well. 
Finally, group cohesion is strengthened by the bans. To be sure, the bans tell me 
what NOT to do. However, the more important message of the religious bans is that 
we want to avoid contact with those who would otherwise eat, drink, and sing differ-
ent melodies 
Sosis56 states the problem explicitly: evolutionary theory predicts that biological 
beings will do what they can to preserve limited resources. There may be reason to 
believe that a member will share his resources – food and cover – with other members 
of his group. But why would anyone voluntarily sacriﬁ ce valuable resources to an 
invisible deity? Why would someone sacriﬁ ce a bull, a lamb or even a turtle dove that 
could otherwise be used to provide valuable nutrition? Why would a society spend its 
time energy and resources producing dye for a priestly class? If a certain animal were 
available for consumption, why would members of a group not eat it simply because 
it was on the wrong list or because it was not slaughtered properly? 
The answers to the above questions may be studied with the components of signal 
theory and reciprocal altruism. I want to belong to the group so I do these things in 
public to proclaim my willingness to be part of the group and reap the group beneﬁ ts 
of membership. Then another question arises: why would a member of the group 
perform rites and rituals in the privacy of their own home?
Here we need to return to one of the classic theories within social psychology: 
cognitive dissonance. The theory states succinctly “if a person is induced to do or say 
something which is contrary to his private opinion, there will be a tendency for him 
55  R. Sosis, Religious Behaviors…
56  Ibidem; R. Sosis, C. Alcorta, Signaling, Solidarity, and the Sacred: The Evolution of Religious 
Behavior, “Evolutionary Anthropology” 2003, No. 12, p. 264–274.
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to change his opinion so as to bring it into correspondence with what he has done or 
said”57.
When cognitive dissonance is added to the mix, a fairly complete picture of re-
ligious observance comes into focus. As noted, a deity policing our behaviours58 is 
a common belief in most religions. This deity’s existence is beyond proof. However, 
individuals tend to be internally honest – not wanting to lie to themselves. We do, 
indeed, have the power of deception and self-deception59 (but if we can be true to 
ourselves then we tend to be better off.
Inasmuch as Jewish rituals are practiced both in the public and private spheres, 
there will also be intra-personal pressure to ensure that meals taken at home, prayer 
recited at home, candles lit in private are within the bounds of religious observance – 
in the absence of a policing community, and potentially in the absence of a policing 
God. When I signal my group members I gain personal beneﬁ ts. It is important for 
them to see me dress appropriately (badge) pray aloud (behaviour), and refrain from 
pork (ban). But why at home? Even more importantly, why at home when I have no 
reason to believe that anyone will check?
Because I check. And I am honest. It would be too hard to conform to certain 
expectations if I did not buy into them60. However, once I do behave a certain way 
I have actually convinced myself that this is the best way to behave61. I behave there-
fore I believe. This belief in turn leads to more behaviours until, ﬁ nally, I am prepared 
to perform rituals even when I am alone, and even if I doubt that God actually polices 
my compliance.
Richard Sosis puts it succinctly:  
The three B’s primarily communicate group commitments, but in addition they indexically 
signal acceptance of the community’s moral codes. They are effective signal because their cost-
liness ensures their reliability. Adherents are able to endure their costliness because repeated 
performance of religious activities can foster the belief in the theologies, which provide endur-
ing meaning for the practices by arousing emotions and generating dissonance62. 
The culture that succeeds in prescribing rites and rituals and proscribing activities 
and assists its followers to convince themselves of the righteousness of their actions 
will create a successful religion that will mimetically replicate itself for generations 
to come.
57  L. Festinger, J.M. Carlsmith, Cognitive consequences of forced compliance, “The Journal of Ab-
normal and Social Psychology”, 1959, No.  58, p. 209.
58  Q.D. Atkinson, P. Bourrat, Beliefs about God…; A. Mahoney, Theological Expressions as Costly 
Signals…
59  S. Pinker, How the Mind Works; R.L. Trivers, The evolution of reciprocal altruism…; R. Wright, 
The Moral Animal…
60  R. Sosis, Why aren’t we all Hutterites?...
61  L. Festinger, A theory of cognitive dissonance…; Idem, Cognitive dissonance…
62  R. Sosis, Religious Behaviors…, p. 83.
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Bio-psychology of Jewish religious practice
What follows is a brief examination of certain Jewish religious practices. It is not 
meant to be comprehensive; rather it is an initial attempt to examine few practical 
rituals with the theoretical framework. It will be important to keep in mind the dif-
ferent currencies of human-religious culture. There is of course the tangible currency 
of the time – food from both animal and plant sources. Nevertheless, equally, if not 
more important is the currency of socio-cultural position and prestige. The reward 
may not be objectively measureable, but the subjective value is of utmost importance. 
We will start with certain laws set out in the Torah. We will then explore a number of 
rituals from the Rabbinic period (1st century BCE to 6th century CE). The ﬁ nal step 
will be a look at certain medieval sources for Jewish practice.
Jewish cultic practice
The most obvious signal is that of animal sacriﬁ ce. Torah law commands Israelites 
to set aside a portion of their earnings for hekdesh, an offering brought to the Temple 
in Jerusalem as a manner of worship. The process lasted over the life of the ﬁ elds 
and herds requiring landowners to bring tithes to the Temple on at least three annual 
occasions. 
Leviticus 27 v 9-10 reads as follows:
And if it be a beast, that men bring an offering unto God, all that any man give unto God shall be 
holy. He shall not alter it, nor change it, a good for a bad, or a bad for a good; and if he changes 
a beast for beast, then both it and that for which it is changed shall be holy.
What is being signalled? That is, what is the cultural beneﬁ t of the signals being 
sent? At ﬁ rst blush, it seems self-explanatory. The more God has blessed me, the 
more I must give in return for this blessing. The bigger my herd, the more bountiful 
my harvest, the more grateful I am to God. But perhaps the reverse is true. Perhaps 
God “commands” what is good for society63.
Yet there is much more. The Israelites were commanded to bring most of the sac-
riﬁ ces at the same time of the year. The three pilgrimage festivals were a time when 
many came to Jerusalem to pay their dues. The Bible tells us that King Solomon ap-
parently played on the natural process of cognitive dissonance in order to strengthen 
his hold over the people. If I bring one-tenth of my holdings each year to Jerusalem, 
then, according to the theory of cognitive dissonance, I must feel that Jerusalem is 
central to my being, as is the king in Jerusalem. Additionally, Solomon had to signal 
to other kings that he was well protected. So, those who would ﬁ ght against me be-
ware. I have a large treasury that can wage war against any enemy.
63  S. Stewart-Williams, Darwin, God and the Meaning of Life: How evolutionary theory undermines 
everything you thought you knew, Cambridge 2010.
Publikacja objęta jest prawem autorskim. Wszelkie prawa zastrzeżone. Kopiowanie i rozpowszechnianie zabronione.  
Publikacja przeznaczona jedynie dla klientów indywidualnych. Zakaz rozpowszechniania i udostępniania serwisach bibliotecznych
197
But we digress. The other signals are the ones between the pilgrims to Jerusalem. 
The greater my offering, the wealthier I am. As such the better it would be to marry 
your daughters to my sons and ensure well cared for progeny in the future. If I can 
afford to bring 10 oxen, four sheep and various sundry items, then I can afford even 
more.
The laws of temurah heighten this point. Each Israelite is encouraged to make vol-
untary offerings to God at the temple. But what happens if the designated animal or 
plant gets lost in my stock? After all, I cannot brand an animal or otherwise damage 
fruit from the tree – it invalidates it for sacriﬁ cial purposes. The simplest solution is to 
swap the offering with another. Yet the Torah teaches that I must bring both the origi-
nal and the replacement. In other words, I am rich enough to lose track of one of my 
animals and make the donation anyway. The bio-cultural message is that I am worthy 
of your consideration and you should send your children to meet me or my children.
Priestly garments
As in all early societies, the Bible tells of a caste-based society. In its time, it would 
seem to be a waste – a costly signal – to colour garments. Many biblical scholars64 
presume that clothes at the time of the Bible were what we call earth tones today – 
the colour that the wool or leather is when it is removed from the animal. However, 
certain articles of clothing were supposed to be dyed certain colours, in this case light 
blue or azure. Israelites were commanded to dye one string on the fringes they were 
ordered to attach to their clothing. However, the high priest’s clothes were nearly 
60% azure. That in and of itself may be of no concern until we are told that the dye 
was to be taken from a particular snail common to the ancient land of Israel. Despite 
its commonness, it would still take a great deal of means and skill to produce the dye. 
The clear message is that I am of the wealthier caste, and it would be to your beneﬁ t 
to marry into my family. 
Indeed, it was considered a special honour to marry into the priestly class. That 
gave one access to the sacriﬁ ces brought on the regular pilgrimages to Israel. Even 
if the narrative in the Torah is not historically true, the idea that the high priest, the 
regular priests and others were commanded to dye part or all of some garments sends 
an important message: we priests can waste our resources on the costly signals of red, 
purple and blue. 
Further, the fabrics used to produce the clothing were also a signal. Priestly gar-
ments were shaatnez – an intermingled weaving together of linen and wool. In ge-
neral, this combination is forbidden. But, shaatnez was common in priests’ clothing 
in the ancient Near East in general and in Egypt and Canaan in particular65. Shaatnez 
was a costly signal of status at the time. Apparently, it is not so simple to weave these 
textiles together and the ability to do so took, at the time, a great deal of skill. As such 
it was reserved for the wealthy – in biblical times the priests. 
64  E.g. C.M. Carmichael, Law, legend, and incest in the Bible: Leviticus 18–20, Ithaca 1997.
65  Ibidem.
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According to Israel Knohl66, a modern Israeli biblical scholar, one of the smaller 
but more inﬂ uential nomadic tribes that eventually joined forces with other nomads 
of the time to form what we call today the ancient Israelites was from Egypt. Indeed, 
Knoll theorises that they came from the priestly class of Egypt, who were expelled 
because of their monotheistic belief system. The Torah explicitly instructs the high 
priest to wear shaatnez and dye their clothes. To the degree that it was easy to recog-
nise, Carmichael points out, it was a clear badge of honour to wear shaatnez coloured 
azure. And your station would be recognised quickly as well.
Diet
The diet prescribed in the Torah bears great similarity to that of other Near Eastern 
people67. One dietary restriction sets this ban apart from other cultures of the time: 
the pig. Walton, Matthews and Chavalas note that some cultures included pigs in 
their cultic practice. Either way, the pig quickly became the symbol of impurity in the 
Jewish dietary laws. 
This restriction was clearly community building. It was used by the rabbis of 
the early tanaitic period (1st century BCE to 3rd century CE) as the symbol of all 
evil: stay away from the pig lest those who eat it assimilate you into their culture. 
The dominant conquering cultures of the time were often associated with pigs in the 
early rabbinic literature (Midrash Rabba [the great midrash] Genesis Rabba 25). The 
implication, then, all things considered tainted by the swine are avoided, the Israelite 
– ultimately Jewish culture – will continue to thrive in the face of its arch cultural 
enemy of the time, Rome. 
Talmudic period
The above examples may be somewhat simplistic or even obvious to those who read 
the Bible. Whether we treat the Bible as an historical account of actual happenings 
or a document redacted from many sources over time, its mission was to create a cul-
ture. A meme with many adherents who will make many people, be fruitful, multiply, 
and ﬁ ll the earth.
The same may be said of the treatises that comprise rabbinic literature composed 
between the 1st century BCE and the 6th century CE. Indeed, the Rabbis at the time 
of the end of the Second Temple period (1st–2nd century CE) had a formidable task. 
They had to take the Israelites into exile, yet make sure that there would be strong 
enough group cohesion to keep the new Jews together. 
66  I. Knohl, The Bible’s Genetic Code, Or Yehuda 2008.
67  J.H. Walton, V.H. Matthews, M.W. Chavalas, The IVP Bible Background Commentary: Old Te-
stament, Downers Grove, Il, 2000.
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Intuitively, they built upon the cultic practice and took advantage of human nature 
to devise a system of rites and behaviours that have lasted two millennia or more. 
They built it upon HADD theory68, the notion that we seek agents, and combined it 
with ideas that are only minimally counter intuitive69. This latter concept deserves 
some explanation. It assumes that human intuition can only tolerate a certain degree 
of counter intuitive beliefs. After crossing that line, the believers will cease to believe 
– because the belief runs too far aﬁ eld to be possible. 
As rabbinic Judaism has become normative Judaism, the rites and rituals that 
emerged from that culture must be the primary focus of any serious study of the im-
pact of Jewish religious practice. The rabbis of the Talmud needed to redeﬁ ne cultural 
currency. Israel could no longer signal their allegiance with sacriﬁ ces offered at the 
Temple in Jerusalem. The most readily available currency was time. In order to signal 
my worthiness, I must be willing to “waste” my time, as I could no longer waste my 
food. This is “waste” according to Zahavi’s costly signal theory indicated above. 
Time: Jewish prayer and study ritual
The ﬁ rst Mishna, the basic legal codex edited in the 2nd century C.E. and codiﬁ ed at 
the beginning of the 3rd, asks: “From when may we recite the shema in the evening?” 
(Mishne, Berachot 1:1) The fourth chapter sets time guidelines during which daily 
prayer is most acceptable. The signal, then, is that despite other seemingly important 
things to do, I must “waste” my time in order to prove that I am a worthy member of 
society. Indeed, the more time I spend in prayer, the more pious I must be. The more 
pious means that I have more means at my disposal and do not need to spend my time 
attending to them. Either my servants will do it or I have so much that, it is really not 
necessary that I attend to my business. 
Jewish prayer behaviour has multifaceted evolutionary value. Attendance at ser-
vices sends costly signals, invokes reciprocal altruism, and exhibits badges and bans 
all in one ritualistic practice. The average morning service on a weekday can take 
between 30 and 45 minutes. Services on the Sabbath and holidays can run anywhere 
from 1.5 hours to four70. Though shorter, each lasting 10 to 15 minutes, the afternoon 
and evening services require participants to sacriﬁ ce work and or family time. Again, 
the signal of willingness to sacriﬁ ce the currency of time comes in place of the sacri-
ﬁ ce of other tangible resources – I signal the commitment to community. In as much 
as certain prayers require a quorum of ten attendees, they also signal their willingness 
to reciprocity.
68  J.L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God?; S. Pinker, How the Mind Works…
69  S. Atran, A. Norenzayan, Religion’s Evolutionary Landscape…
70  Average times are based upon mainstream services i.e. modern orthodox and conservative. There 
are sects that take longer. Ultra-orthodox services may be longer. Indeed, they tend to be more involved 
in costly signals; R. Sosis, Why are Synagogue Services so Long? An Evolutionary Examination of Jewish 
Ritual Signals’ [in:] Judaism in Biological Perspective: Biblical Lore and Judaic Practices, R. Goldberg 
(ed.), Boulder 2009, p.199–233
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The time spent by an average service attending Jew is great. This is most interest-
ing in the light of Western societal evolution. Until just one generation ago, perhaps 
two, the cost of attending Shabbat services was time spent out of work. It was a signal 
sending the message that I am willing to sacriﬁ ce trade and income for the sake of 
the community. Enter altruism. Today, in many communities, the currency of time is 
paid from leisure time. Leisure time is seen as even more valuable in many Western 
cultures than work time. That one is willing to refrain from leisure is quite a powerful 
signal to the members of the community.
Further, much esteem is afforded to those who are considered worthy to lead the 
congregation in the many forms of prayer. The time spent perfecting these skills is 
yet another sign of what one is willing to sacriﬁ ce to be a member of the community, 
which in turn, lest we forget, signals worthiness for marriage – either their own or of 
their children. If I come regularly to synagogue, lead the service well, read expertly 
from the Torah, then my children or I are worthy mates.
The altruistic side of synagogue attendance is spelled out above. But what of reci-
procity? Members are altruistically willing to sacriﬁ ce time to participate, but where 
is the second crucial feature of communal evolution as set forth by Sosis71 and others? 
Anyone who has even attended services regularly will immediately be able to recog-
nise the cheats. They are those who come late. Their signal is clear. Yes, I am willing 
and able to sacriﬁ ce this much work or leisure, but no more. They are easy to spot. 
The currency payback in the synagogue is honour – honour given to those, who 
would lead. However, if those members lead “too often” they are akin to the bats that 
stay back night after night feigning illness to gain from their kin’s hunt. With certain 
exceptions to the hierarchy of who “ought” to lead the service, if one person receives 
too many, they are seen as cheats. They will be scorned and disparaged for hoarding 
too much of the precious resource (honour) garnered by their willingness to invest 
too much time in perfecting their leadership skills. To be sure, there are mimetic dif-
ferences from community to community. Some hire professionals to do some of the 
major tasks. These professionals are often rewarded with respect – attaining access to 
the precious resource of reproductive offers. Nevertheless, there are always the hon-
ours to be handed out. In addition, those who take too much, without giving in return 
by allowing others an opportunity to signal are quickly labelled cheats. They take too 
many of the honours that are available, honour being the resource comparable to the 
blood shared by the bats.
Jewish prayer not only fulﬁ ls the behaviour component according to Sosis72. There 
are also signiﬁ cant badges and bans. The talit (prayer shawl) and teﬁ llin (phylacter-
ies) are the most obvious badges. Indeed, these badges will often serve as signals of 
expendable wealth to the degree that they are elaborate. Prices can vary greatly as 
can size. In certain communities, the talit is worn only by married men – its absence 
signalling availability status. The size and make of the teﬁ llin also signal worthiness. 
Anyone who knows a Jewish family who has purchased teﬁ llin for a son or in certain 
71  R. Sosis, Religious Behaviors, Badges, and Bans…; R. Sosis, Why are Synagogue Services so 
Long?…
72  R. Sosis, Religious Behaviors, Badges, and Bans…
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cases for a daughter, knows how much thought can be placed into their purchase. 
The Torah teaches that Jews must bind what are essentially amulets to their arms and 
place similar amulets on their heads each day. These amulets can range in price from 
$125 to $1500 or more. This is in Richard Sosis’73 terms a true badge – a sometimes 
very costly signal that I wear literally on my sleeve for others to see what sort of 
ﬁ nancial handicap I am willing to place on myself in order to signal my worth. And 
this is generally done at a public prayer service among the peers to whom I signal.
There are many more badges that can be noted, but the scope of this paper does 
not permit further elaboration.
The third and ﬁ nal B – the bans according to Sosis – varies from one community 
to the next. As a rule, non-Jews are banned from most roles in most synagogues. The 
more liberal the community, the more a non-Jew will be invited to participate, but all 
communities do ban non-Jews from certain aspects of Jewish prayer.
Torah study is another handicap or costly signal behaviour74. The currency by 
which Torah study is attained is time. The more time one spends learning, the greater 
the honour accorded. Honour, in turn, translates into marriageability. In fact, Maimo-
nides codiﬁ es it to the law that one should stay close to the righteous Talmid Hacham, 
feed him and learn from his ways (Book of Commandments Positive commandment 
no. 6; Hilchot Deot 6:1-2), a father should seek a Talmid Hacham for his daughter 
to marry (ibid). Much has been written lauding Torah study as a worthy pursuit that 
confers esteem to those who excel at it. The particular topics of Torah study reﬂ ect 
mimetic differences between communities. Nevertheless, no matter what group the 
scholar calls home, his or her scholarship affords access to certain communal re-
sources that are otherwise unavailable to the Torah laity.
The obvious critique of this paper is that it is parochial. It is obvious that Jews 
will care about other Jews and that they will do what it takes to signal them. But we 
will conclude with a ﬁ nal moral/ethical directive from Talmudic times that is taken 
seriously in today’s non-fundamentalist Jewish world. And it goes directly to D.S. 
Wilson’s and E.O. Wilson’s maxim, “Selﬁ shness beats altruism within groups. Altru-
istic groups beat selﬁ sh groups. Everything else is commentary”75. 
The rabbis of the Talmud taught that there are many things Jews must do for their 
non-Jewish neighbours Mipne Darchei Shalom – for the sake of peace. Jews are 
taught that they must heal the non-Jewish sick Mipne Darchei Shalom. Jews must 
bury the non-Jewish dead Mipne Darchei Shalom. They must ask after their welfare 
and wish them well on their holidays Mipne Darchei Shalom. Jews must even donate 
charity to non-Jewish poor Mipne Darchei Shalom (Babylonian Talmud, Tractate 
Gittin p.60b). 
There are over 2,500 references to this motivation in rabbinic literature. This may 
explain how the Jewish religion has survived for more than 2,500 years, despite all 
odds. Indeed, according to Wilson and Wilson, any religion, that preaches altruism, 
seems destined to outlast those non-altruistic groups.
73  Ibidem.
74  A. Mahoney, Theological Expressions as Costly Signals…
75  D.S. Wilson, E.O. Wison, Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology, “The Quarterly 
Review of Biology” 2007, No. 82, p. 335.
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